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CBackground: A commonly held view of the decision rule in economic
evaluations in health care is that the final incremental cost-effective-
ness ratio needs to be judged against some threshold, which is equal
for all quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gains. This reflects the as-
sumption that “a QALY is a QALY” no matter who receives it, or the
equity notion that all QALY gains are equally valuable, regardless of the
context in which they are realized. If such an assumption does not
adequately reflect the distributional concerns in society, however,
different thresholds could be used for different QALY gains, whose
relative values can be seen as “equity weights.” Aim: Our aim was to
xplore the relationship between equity or distributional concerns and O
olicy
R Ro
ty fo
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2012.07.002he social value of QALYs within the health economics literature. In
ight of the empirical interest in equity-related concerns as well as the
ature and height of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio thresh-
ld, this study investigates the “common ground” between the two
treams of literature and considers how the empirical literature esti-
ating the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio threshold treats exist-
ng distributional considerations.
eywords: distributional concern, economic evaluations, efficiency, eq-
ity, QALY, threshold, WTP.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Some form of rationing or priority setting in the health care sector
is inevitable given finite resources. In such a context, efficiency
and equity are two important objectives. The goal of maximizing
efficiency in resource allocation can be restated asmaximizing the
amount of health produced per euro spent [1]. Under such a
maxim, scarce resources are allocated to patient groups and inter-
ventions that produce the most health per unit invested and
steered away from those that produce less. To inform social deci-
sions in health and increase the efficiency in the use of resources,
policymakers in some countries rely on the results of economic
evaluations, often in the form of a cost-utility analysis (CUA). The
results of a CUA are commonly summarized in an incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)—a measure of the additional costs
and benefits of the intervention relative to an adequate compara-
tor. In a CUA, benefits are expressed in terms of quality-adjusted
life-years, or QALYs. The meaning and acceptability of any ICER is
determined by judging it in relation to some monetary threshold
value, whose nature is a matter of debate (e.g., [2]). Here, we con-
sider it to represent the monetary value society places on a QALY
(assuming, thus, a flexible and, in a conventional sense, optimal
health care budget ensuring that the cost-effectiveness of mar-
ginal spending in the health care sector equals the societal value
placed on a gained QALY [e.g., [2]]). The ICER threshold then de-
fines themonetary value belowwhich an intervention can be con-
sidered efficient (or welfare improving) and above which it is not.
* Address correspondence to:AnaBobinac, Department of Health P
rasmus University Rotterdam (iBMG/iMTA), P.O. Box 1738, 3000 D
E-mail: bobinac@bmg.eur.nl.
098-3015 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, International Socie
ublished by Elsevier Inc.The implicit equity approach commonly taken in a CUA is to as-
sign equal value to each QALY, irrespective of the characteristics
of recipients or the intervention (i.e., “a QALY is a QALY”). This
approach has been the topic ofmuch debate, also because it seems
partly at odds with another equity approach—the explicit concern
for an increasingly equitable distribution of health and health care
(note that an equitable distribution of health depends only partly
on the health care system, i.e., on the distribution of health care
[3,4]), implying different values for different QALYs (i.e., “a QALY is
not a QALY”). This explicit concern for equity is reflected in assign-
ing differing weights to QALYs depending on the recipients’ or
interventions’ characteristics.
Equity is a broad notion comprising many aspects and is best
seen as a multidimensional concept (e.g., [3–6]). Striving for an
equitable distribution of health and health care mostly is a reflec-
tion of societal preferences for the distribution of health (care).
The common notion of “economic efficiency” may, however, not
fully represent such societal preferences (e.g., [7–10]). In fact, there
is a large body of literature suggesting that the allocation decisions
in health care should take the relative social value of QALYs in
different populations into account. This supports the notion that a
QALY isnot aQALY regardless ofwhogets it (e.g., [6,8,10–24]).Within
the framework of economic evaluations, this implies assigningmore
weight to QALYs achieved in certain subgroups. Subsequently,more
resources will be steered in their direction, ceteris paribus, even
though they may not be the most efficient QALY producers.
On what basis QALYs are to be weighted depends on the par-
ticular argument that determineswhat is unfairly unequal, that is,
&Management and Institute forMedical TechnologyAssessment,
tterdam, The Netherlands.
r Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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1120 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 1 1 9 – 1 1 2 6which characteristics of patients or illnesses are perceived to
make someone worse off (in terms of health) by members of soci-
ety and thus more deserving of health improvements. Which
characteristics of patients or illnesses should determine the
weight attached to health gains, andwhichnotions are defendable
and consistent withmoral arguments, intuitions, observable soci-
etal values, and judgments, is a matter of current discussion and
investigation (e.g., [25,26]).
Some form of a trade-off between the objectives of efficiency
and equity can ensure both are incorporated into priority setting
[1] and into economic evaluations. If adequately addressed, the
trade-off would provide decision makers with more information
relevant to health care decisions [27]. One important issue is how
to make this trade-off explicit, transparent, and systematic rather
than a matter of intuition and implicit values. If we consider eco-
nomic evaluation a helpful tool in health care decision making,
one condition for a sound and explicit equity-efficiency trade-off is
a thoughtful incorporation of equity concerns in economic evalu-
ations. In that sense, it is important to consider the decision-mak-
ing framework of CUA, written as follows:
Vi  Qi  c  0 (1)
here vi denotes the value attached to an additional unit of QALYs
of type i, Qi denotes the incremental QALY gain of type i, and c
enotes the incremental cost of the intervention. Type i denotes
he “equity segment” to which the QALY gain, and thus the corre-
ponding value vi, belongs. The common decision rule in eco-
omic evaluations is for benefits to outweigh costs, and thus Equa-
ion 1 can be rewritten as
c ⁄Qi  Vi (2)
which shows that the costs incurred to produce QALYs of equity
type i should not exceed the value per QALY of type i. Often, one
threshold is used for all QALY gains under the assumption that “a
QALY is a QALY,” or the equity notion that all QALY gains are
equally valuable regardless of their context. If such an assumption
does not adequately reflect distributional concerns in society, dif-
ferent thresholds can be used for different QALY gains whose rel-
ative values can be seen as “equity weights.” Therefore, a clear
relationship exists between equity or distributional concerns on
the one hand and the social value of QALYs on the other. This
study focuses on that relationship.
The relationship between the threshold anddistributional con-
cerns already exists, albeit sometimes implicitly. The National In-
stitute for Clinical Excellence, for instance, requests that a tech-
nology with an ICER of more than £20,000 per QALY reference “the
particular features of the condition and population receiving the
technology” to increase its chances of being reimbursed [28].
Seemingly, therefore, if the condition or population appeals to
certain notions of deservingness, the ICER threshold might be
higher. Recently, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
even indicated that certain interventions (e.g., life-prolonging)
might be approved despite less favorable cost-effectiveness [29–
31], depending on the context in which such QALYs are gained. In
the Netherlands, rather than formulating an exception to a more or
less fixed threshold, a general rule has been formulated highlighting
the relationship betweenequity concerns and theQALYvalue. Based
on a specific notion of equitable distribution of health (care), the
threshold varies with the severity of the disease (e.g., [32]).
Although the distributional concerns and the ICER threshold
re related in practice, as shown in the examples above, it is inter-
sting to explore how that relationship has been treated in the
ealth economics literature—especially in light of recent and
ively empirical interest in equity-related concerns as well as the
ature and height of the ICER threshold. Our study investigates
he “common ground” between the empirical literature on esti-
ating the monetary value of a QALY, which is seen here as the wppropriate ICER threshold (e.g., [2]), and the literature on distri-
utional considerations in allocating health and health care. For
xample, do existing studies allude to or discuss the variations in
CER threshold estimates stemming from possible distributional
oncerns, such as health status, socioeconomic characteristics, or
ealth care consumption history? Have any empirical studies es-
imated the value of QALY gains achieved in different segments of
he population, where the segments were defined in terms of
quity-relevant characteristics (e.g., age or severity of illness)? Our
tudy looks to answer these questions by providing a thematic
rather than systematic) overview of the empirical literature on
rominent distributional concerns and the empirical literature on
he ICER threshold, and to establish their complementarity. For
ecent systematic reviews of the literature regarding equity con-
iderations, we refer to Dolan et al. [10] and Schwappach [18].
The Context of the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off
In the context of economic evaluations, the trade-off between eq-
uity and efficiency, studied in both the general public and policy-
makers [10,18,33,34], enables the maximization of equity-adjusted
health outcomes, rather than simply the maximization of health
outcomes. In principle, the concerns for equity can be introduced
into economic evaluations or the subsequent decision-making
process by using qualitative and/or quantitative evidence on so-
cial preferences (the question of how to incorporate any prefer-
ences for the distribution of health effects is separate from the
question of how to derive them [35]).
The qualitative approach provides decision makers with a de-
scriptive review of potentially relevant information on equity-re-
lated impacts alongside “standard” economic evaluation results
[35]. Reimbursement decisions could then take account of this in-
formation, but it is left to the policymakers to decide on their
relative importance (although quantitative information can be de-
rived from subsequent decisions). For instance, the rankings of
interventions based on their ICERs can be reordered on the basis of
qualitative information about the values and priorities expressed
by the public (e.g., as in the “Oregon experiment,” [36]). Appraisal
hases in the full process of decision making, such as those used
n the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, also may be seen as
ualitative approaches that account for nonquantified, yet impor-
ant aspects in reaching a final decision.
Quantitative evidence can be used to adjust—explicitly and
uantitatively—either the cost-effectiveness threshold or the
CER. The most prominent quantitative approaches are equity
eighting and multicriteria decision analysis (for the latter, see
37,38]). Equity weighting allows a quantitative adjustment of the
stimated ICER to account for equity concerns, which is the focus
ere. Equity weights (e.g., [39–42]) are a way of attributing more or
ess importance (or value) to health benefits achieved in some cir-
umstances relative to others. They can be estimated in several
ays, such as through willingness-to-pay (WTP) exercises, through
erson trade-off exercises, or through conjoint analysis (e.g.,
7,10,43,44]). The obtained weights can subsequently be applied
ithin economic evaluations either by adjusting the QALY gains
ithin the ICER or by adjusting the ICER threshold. The two ap-
roaches should yield mathematically equal outcomes [45].
In general terms, we can fix the threshold value (vi) in the con-
entional decision rule (2) by allowing equity weights on the left-
and side, reflecting the relative value of QALYs gained relative to
he reference QALY value (v*):
c ⁄ (i  Qi)  V
∗ (3)
here i is the relative value of the QALY compared with the ref-
erence QALY, that is, v /v*. Using a fixed threshold with equityi
eights is thus essentially equal to using a flexible threshold and no
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1121V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 1 1 9 – 1 1 2 6equity weights. While this notion need not be surprising, and seems
to be implicitly assumed in earlier work (e.g., Nord [46]), for the pur-
pose of the current article, it is appropriate to explicate this.
Having a set of weights to apply within the CUA framework,
however, will be useful only in conjunctionwith an ICER threshold
that represents a known (reference) case in terms of equity. For
example, if some weight of 1.5 is to have its desired meaning, the
reference case receiving a weight of 1 need to be fully specified
with respect to the equity-relevant characteristics of patients
and/or their illness. Likewise, a £20,000 threshold is useful in con-
junction with weights only when it is specified to the reference
case the value actually refers to. A lack of clarity about what the
reference cases for either the weights or the threshold refer to
precludes using the weights meaningfully within a full decision
framework. We next highlight distributional concerns in such
contexts and then turn our attention to empirical estimates of the
ICER threshold.
Which Distributional Concerns Matter?
The choice of equity-relevant characteristics, that is, the aspects
determining who is worse off, depends on the justification or dif-
ferent ethical arguments for preferential treatment of some peo-
ple over others. Generally, the worse off may be considered enti-
tled to preferential treatment because they suffer undeserved
relative deprivation and usually have more urgent needs [47]. Al-
though consensus on favoringworse-off groups or those subject to
greater inequality in the situation of scarcity seems to exist, de-
bate on the appropriate argument for deciding who should be re-
garded as more deprived and what actually is considered inequi-
table is ongoing (e.g., [25,26]).
Several characteristics of patients and illnesses have been put
forward as possible criteria [10,18,25,48]. The issue regarding who
is worse off has been mostly defined and discussed in terms of
illness severity and age. Three types of personal characteristics
have most frequently been discussed [25]: those that place the
person in a causal relationship with the illness, that is, the extent
to which a particular illness might have been influenced by a per-
son’s own actions (e.g., smoking); those that refer to a person’s
relations to other people in society (e.g., having children); and,
finally, those that are “embodied” in a person’s self—physically,
intellectually, or attitudinally (e.g., sex, sexual orientation). Social
preferences regarding such distributional concerns have been in-
vestigated empirically, in isolation and in a multiattribute setting
(e.g., [19,49–51]), as general principles, or as an issue within the
context of a particular intervention. Respondents in these empir-
ical studies usually answered questions about whether and to
what extent a particular characteristic of patients or illness should
be relevant in prioritizing scarce resources. Important to the con-
text of our study, these empirical studies did not elicit equity
weights by deriving some type ofWTP for different QALY gains (or
differingWTP estimates for QALYs achieved in different segments
of the population) but mostly traded off health gains in groups of
beneficiaries (e.g., younger vs. older patients) without any reference
to the threshold value. Therefore, they did not establish a direct re-
lationship between the ICER threshold and equity concerns. If one
would do so for one of the relevant groups, thus establishing an an-
chor point, the equity weights would subsequently reveal the im-
plied value of health gains in all other segments.
Severity of illness emerges as the most important discrimina-
tor between care recipients. This has beennoted in empirical stud-
ies reporting experimental and attitudinal data (e.g., [26,52–56]).
Severity is usually defined in terms of the pretreatment health
state of patients or the expected QALY profile in the case of no
treatment (i.e., future health prospect). The value of the health
gain was commonly found to be higher in persons whose initial
health state was worse, ceteris paribus [15,57–60], and in those with atheworst prospectivehealth if left untreated [15]. Patientswithmod-
rate health problems who improve considerably with treatment,
herefore, may not necessarily be favored over patients with severe
ealth problems who improve less with treatment (e.g., [54–61]).
Such rules, however, often come with particular exceptions.
or instance, there may be a threshold effect [62]. Prognosis with-
ut treatment, for example, may not be so important for patients
aining only a very small amount of health due to a new treat-
ent. Similarly, little support was found for programs that pro-
ided some improvement yet left patients in relatively poor health
tates after treatment [63]. People also appear to prefer larger
ains for fewer people over smaller gains for more people, even if
n the latter case the aggregate health gain is larger. The threshold
or preferring a concentration of benefits when the magnitude of
ndividual health gains is not thinly spread across many individ-
als may vary among populations [13,14,64]. This might be due to
mall gains not having the required “welfare significance” and a
eaningful benefit [64]. In relation to life years, Dolan and Cook-
on [58] found that people were willing to make health gain trade-
offs between patient groups only once the differences in the num-
ber of life years gained exceeded a certain threshold.
Age is the next most important equity consideration and can
be closely related to the severity argument. The concern for age
was famously operationalized with the fair innings argument of
Williams [11], proposing that everyone is entitled to a certain
quality-adjusted) life span, labeled “fair innings.” In general,
oung patients are considered worse off since they have not yet
ad their fair share of life. The conventional fair innings “ageism”
65,66] says that those people reaching their fair innings should be
iven a weight of 1 in the priority-setting calculus and individuals
ith poorer lifetime prospects than the fair innings should be
iven a relative weight larger than 1. Age weights, however, might
lso have other justifications—weighting the young higher than
he old could actually be supported by both equity and efficiency
rguments [41,42,67]. Among the efficiency arguments, most
rominent ones account for the fact that the young contribute
ore to society (in economic terms, have young children, etc.) and
he old usually have lower capacity to benefit in terms of future life
ears and propensity toward comorbidity [68]. These are labeled
roductivity ageism and health maximization ageism [32,66]. To
ccount for it, Murray and Lopez [41] suggest “unequal ageweights
s an attempt to capture different social roles at different ages.” It
s important to disentangle the different motives—equity- or effi-
iency-related—behind preferential treatment of the young over
he old. Opposing views have also been expressed, however; see,
or example, an extensive review on cost-effectiveness and age-
sm by Edlin et al. [68]. The topic has also been discussed by, for
xample, Cohen Almagor [69] and Werntoft et al. [70].
Furthermore, Stolk et al. [32] operationalized the concept of
proportional shortfall,” which poses that priority should be deter-
ined by the proportion of QALYs that people lose relative to their
emaining life expectancy due to some illness. Proportional short-
all compares individuals in relative terms todeterminewho isworse
ff. Stolk et al. [21] found that people’s distributional preferences
ere most in line with the fair innings argument, followed by the
roportional shortfall criterion, and then the severity-of-illness cri-
erion. Similar findings were also reported by Tsuchiya et al. [66].
Another equity consideration may be culpability, the extent to
hich a particular illness might be due to one’s own actions (e.g.,
moking). People may consider it fair to allocate resources away
rom those who can (somehow) be held responsible for their ill-
ess in favor of people not responsible for theirs. Cappelen and
orheim [71] have shown, using an example of dental services,
hat there may be a limited but significant role for individual re-
ponsibility (culpability) in health care prioritization. Although
everal studies found that people were in favor of discriminating
gainst those whose ill health is considered to be partly self-in-
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1122 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 1 1 9 – 1 1 2 6flicted [71–73], the view provoked discussion (e.g., [58]). The dis-
ent is caused by difficulties in discerning the factors outside of
elf-control from those that are controllable; even negligence
ight not be fully under our control. Unhealthy habits such as
moking, for example, can be predetermined by socioeconomic
tatus, undermining rather than promoting the idea of fairness
hen distributing according to the principle of culpability.
Other personal characteristics that also have been mentioned
s bases for prioritization include relations with other people, so-
ietal position, and personal characteristics [25]. With respect to
he first two, it seems that the external effects of an illness on
thers may be seen as a reason for differential priority. For in-
tance, priority could be given to married people, people with de-
endents, and breadwinners [74–77]. Some of these reasons may
ead to an accumulation of equity weights in specific groups (e.g.,
arried breadwinners with dependents), which may or may not
e desirable. With respect to personal characteristics, the findings
re inconclusive. Some studies indicate that respondents prefer
reatment of men to women, while others find the opposite; and
ome studies report lower priority for homosexuals [75]. These re-
ultshighlight theneed todistinguishbetweensocially desirable and
ndesirable preferences (i.e., “laundered preferences,” [25]).
Several studies have calculated the weights to be used in equi-
y-efficiency and equity-equity trade-offs (e.g., [7,40,42,78,79]). For
xample, Nord et al. [79] derived weights of 1.1, 1.0, 0.4, and 0.1 for
ife years gained at ages 10, 20, 60, and 80 years, respectively—
ndicating amore than a 10-fold differential between themost and
east preferred age groups. Lancsar et al. [44] used a discrete choice
experiment to derive distributional weights for QALYs based on
both age and disease severity. Their results suggested that the
QALYs should beweighted in only a small number of specific cases
and that in those cases the weights would be relatively small.
Because ofmethodological differences and the design and focus of
empirical studies, however, no consensus on the size and the basis
for weights for any of the mentioned equity-relevant characteris-
tics currently exists. Application of explicit quantitativeweights in
decisionmaking seems uncommon, although ageweighting is op-
erationalized by the World Health Organization in its calculation
Table 1 – WTP per QALY studies.
Study (year) Reference
number
Surv
popul
Zethraeus (1998) 87 Patients
Blumenschein and Johannesson (1998) 86 Patients
Cunningham and Hunt (2000) 89 Patient
King et al. (2005) 91 Patient
Johnson et al. (2000) 84 General
Johannesson and Johansson (1997) 83 General
Olsen and Donaldson (1998) 85 General
Gyrd-Hansen (2003) 90 General
Byrne et al. (2005) 92 General
Donaldson et al. (2011) 93 General
Shiroiwa et al. (2010) 94 General
Bobinac et al. (2010) 95 General
DKK, Danish krone; NOK, Norwegian krone; SEK, Swedish krona; QALY
additional QALY for an unidentified family member; WTPsoc, society’s WTof disability-adjusted life-years [42]. Moreover, there is no wider
consensus on the appropriate normative arguments underlying
equity weights and the suitable methods for eliciting them
[35,45,80]. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, appear to be
moving toward applying equity weights more formally. Then, ob-
viously, the relation between weights and the threshold value be-
comes especially important. We next examine whether the esti-
mates of the monetary value of health gains reported in the
empirical literature address the link between the threshold and
different equity concerns.
Estimates of the ICER Threshold
In considering the link between equity and the ICER threshold, it is
important to recognize that both reflect societal preferences. The
individual and the societal perspective in estimating the value of
health, however, can lead to different conclusions. Society, for
example, may value a gain in the 100-year-old less than a gain in
the 20-year-old, but, for various reasons, the 100-year-old might
value his or her own QALY gain higher than a 20-year-old. Empir-
cal studies estimating the ICER threshold (i.e., the value of a
ALY, v) can thus be evaluated in terms of their usefulness to
ocietal decision making, particularly in terms of whether they
ake the societal perspective in obtaining the v and whether they
pecify the properties of vi. The perspective taken by an empirical
study also determines the degree to which equity-related charac-
teristics are relevant and can be addressed.
As discussed, the ICER threshold could be viewed and empiri-
ally determined in several ways (e.g., [81,82]). The most promi-
ent viewpoint and most frequently used approach to estimate
he height of the ICER threshold in the empirical literature is set-
ing it at the monetary value society attaches to health, that is, at
he maximum (societal) WTP for a QALY. Several studies have
een designed to estimate this value [83–95]. Table 1 shows the
etails and the wide range of results.
Most studies used the public as their sample (Table 1). This can
e considered more useful to societal decision makers since the
Estimate of WTP per QALY
(as reported in the article)
In 2010 €, adjusted for
inflation
SEK 118,400–156,100 16,000–21,500
US $7,000–46,000 7,300–48,200
£506 700
US $12,500–32,000 10,900–28,000
c Can $14,000 9,500
c SEK 5,000–9,000 670–1,200
c NOK 0.2–6.7 0.8
c DKK 88,000 10,900
c US $1,221–6,197 1,100–5,400
c £17,980–265,000 23,000–340,000
c Individual: UK £23,000; 30,000
AU $64,000; 43,000
US $62,000 50,000
WTPfam: UK £26,000; 34,000
AU $78,000; 52,400
US $69,000 55,000
WTPsoc: UK £38,000; 50,000
AU $89,000; 60,000
US $96,000 77,000
c €12,900–€24,500 13,000–25,000
lity-adjusted life-year;WTP, willingness to pay;WTPfam,WTP for aney
ation
publi
publi
publi
publi
publi
publi
publi
publi
, qua
P for an additional QALY for an anonymous person.
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avoided and the marginal income utility between payers (i.e., the
general public) and decision makers in health care can be equal-
ized. The studies, however, almost exclusively took the individual
perspective when estimating WTP values (i.e., WTP for respon-
dents’ own health) and ignored broader societal perspectives (the
full framework of perspectives given byDolan et al. [96]). They also
ostly employed an ex post approach, asking respondents to
magine having a clear need for treatment, and not the ex ante
pproach, asking respondents about their WTP for potential
ealth improvements. Although this is a complex issue and no
olden standard exists, an argument can bemade in favor of the ex
nte approach, because it involves decision making under uncer-
ainty and thus better aligns with common real-life choices.
Gyrd-Hansen [90] and Bobinac et al. [95] are examples of stud-
ies employing the individual ex post individual approach to esti-
mating WTP per QALY. In both studies, representative samples
from the public were used; health gains were defined in terms of
avoiding a health loss and the payment vehicle defined as an out-
of-pocket payment. Gyrd-Hansen [90] used conjoint analysis, and
the value of the QALY was estimated at DKK 88,000 (€13,000). Bo-
binac et al. [95] employed a two-step contingent valuation to ob-
tain a WTP per QALY estimate of €24,500. Although the offered
gains were relatively small, both studies discussed whether the
average health gain of about 0.1 QALYs was small enough to avoid
affecting the marginal utility of income and approach the respon-
dents’ income constraint. For example, Bobinac et al. [95] carried out
extensive testing of the constraining effect of income on WTP esti-
mates. Although they found no evidence of lower variability of WTP
in lowest versus highest income groups, the issue remains open.
A study by Donaldson et al. [93] was formulated as both an ex
ante and an ex post individual question (i.e., valuing an uncertain
and a certain gain, respectively). The study involved a representa-
tive sample and formulated the question in terms of out-of-pocket
payments. WTP to reduce the risk of life-threatening events was
close to €83,000 per QALY compared with around €42,000 for a
life-extending QALY. Estimating gains from improvements in QOL
with no increase in the number of remaining years produced a
value of about €12,000 per QALY. This suggests that the thresholds
of rare andmore highly valued (life-saving) QALYs could be differ-
ent from the individual perspective than the more common QOL-
enhancing QALYs. But, since this study also took an individual
perspective, it did not explicitly consider the variation in WTP
estimates given differences in beneficiaries’ characteristics.
While varying in methods and designs, the above studies all
used a fully individual perspective, that is, elicited a WTP for per-
sonal health gains. Since such studies, by definition, cannot ad-
dress societal equity concerns, we next highlight studies that take
a broader perspective. Shiroiwa et al. [94] elicited ex post out-of-
pocket WTP for a full additional year of survival in perfect health,
in several different countries. The research used a double-bound
conjoint analysis, and WTP for QALY estimates ranged between
€27,000 and €53,000 per QALY. Interestingly, Shiroiwa et al. [94]
added two societalWTPquestions:WTP for an additional QALY for
an unidentified family member (WTPfam) and society’s WTP for
an additional QALY for an anonymous person (WTPsoc). TheWTP-
soc estimate was, however, not a proper (societal) WTP question,
since respondents were not asked to pay for the health gains in
others but ratherwere askedwhat they thought the society should
pay for those gains. The study showed that WTP for a personal
health gain generally is less than both WTPfam and WTPsoc. The
authors explain these findings by caring externalities and altruis-
tic motives. Given that bothWTPfam andWTPsoc were estimated
for anunidentified individual, however, it is not clearwhich family
or societymember the respondents had inmind and thus how the
valuations of health gains varied with characteristics of the recip-
ients. For example, were WTP estimates higher when childrenwere considered, or parents with little children, or some more
severely ill family member? This makes it difficult to link these
findings to equity concerns.
Olsen and Donaldson [85] provide a good example of a study
that, at least implicitly, incorporated equity considerations in a
WTP per QALY exercise. The article reports the WTP for three
different health care programs. Respondents were asked for their
willingness to contribute to each program through extra, ear-
marked taxation, given some (communal) probability of benefiting
from the intervention. They were instructed about 1) the program
to which resources could be allocated (an emergency helicopter
service, a hip replacement operation, and a coronary artery by-
pass; all programs cost 10 million NOK but yield different number
of QALY gains); 2) the hypothetical patients’ initial health prob-
lems and the health states after treatment; 3) the duration of the
improvement; and 4) the characteristics of those benefiting (age,
sex, and where they live). The article compared the WTP values
with the QALYs gained from each program to learn whether, and
why, the two valuation techniques resulted in different program
rankings. Arguably, WTP per QALY can differ between programs
based on characteristics other than their health-enhancing capa-
bilities (e.g., option value, “rescue service,” life-extending vs. qual-
ity-of-life–enhancing intervention and the characteristics of ben-
eficiaries such as age). Results confirmed this intuition. The
observedWTP per QALY was smallest for hip replacements, argu-
ably because the intervention does not save lives, while it was
highest for the emergency helicopter service. This supports the
view that a QALY gained from a life-saving intervention (i.e., pre-
venting imminent death, relating to the “rule of rescue”) may be
valued more than a QALY from a life-extending or quality-of-life–
improving intervention (e.g., [52,54]).
In conclusion, the link between equity and QALY value is not
commonly investigated, highlighting an important area for future
research in which it might be wise to draw lessons from the exist-
ing literature. First, it would be interesting to investigate WTP per
QALY estimates from a social or social-inclusive-personal per-
spective rather than the individual perspective [96]. The individual
approachmight be relevant in settings in which users directly pay
the full costs of an intervention (through user charges or private
insurance) and in situations in which care is viewed as an individ-
ual good [85]. The approach, however,may be seen as less relevant
for societal decisionmaking, where thewider community pays for
health care on the basis of solidarity, where health care is consid-
ered to have utility-bearing characteristics in the form of “caring
externalities” [96,97], and where equity plays an important role.
The appropriate payment vehicle in that context would be the
health insurance premium or taxes (e.g., [85,98]). An exercise in-
corporating such a payment vehicle, in combination with a
broader perspective, would (arguably) yield themost relevant “so-
cial value” of a QALY, that is, the amount of own consumption
individuals are willing to sacrifice through a collective contribu-
tion to pay for QALY gains achieved somewhere in society. How-
ever, to date, no empirical study has incorporated all these prop-
erties and directly obtained the social WTP per QALY. Although
warranted, such results are thus not yet available, sustaining the
gap between the threshold value and equity weights.
Discussion
The aim of our study was to explore the relationship between
distributional preferences in health care resource allocation and
the monetary value of a QALY (the ICER threshold). We found no
firm link between the two topics, such as through some value of
QALY gains in some reference category. This is important since
both equity concerns and the ICER threshold are relevant from a
societal perspective and feed into the same CUA decision frame-
work. Although several empirical studies have demonstrated the
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decisions, the literature estimating theWTP per QALY is primarily
focused on individual values. It is not clear how useful such esti-
mates are to societal decisionmakers or how these individual val-
uations relate to the societal decision-making context. Little is
directly known, therefore, about the (potential) variation in WTP
perQALY estimates caused by differences in equity characteristics
of the recipients of suchQALY gains or the broader circumstances.
To some extent, the current state of affairs can be attributed to
a lack of consensus on the most relevant distributional concerns
and their mutual interactions. Empirical studies regarding equity
weights can be individually selected to support specific view-
points, but, on average, there is no strong consensus on exactly
which distributional concerns should be used in health care deci-
sions. In fact, a wide range of distributional concerns is considered
under the label “equity concerns.” It seems important to stress,
however, that whether some of these equity considerationswould
actually contribute to higher levels of equity in health care or
health if used in decision making is highly controversial.
In practice, several equity characteristics of beneficiariesmight
be relevant at the same time (e.g., young individuals who have
children and a severe disease partly caused by risky behavior),
requiring knowledge about how the equity characteristics are to
interact in decisions. In case equity weights would enter the deci-
sion framework for all considerations independently, it is not clear
whether they should be used in amultiplicative, additive, or other
form [45,99]. While our study focused on investigating the link
between equity concerns and the value of the QALY, it seems
that the differences in approach and concerns included inmany
empirical studies of equity concerns are large, thus hampering
comparability.
The literature offers a wide range of estimates for the value of
a QALY (e.g., [82,100]), which is not surprising given different ap-
proaches taken in the literature and the sensitivity of WTP esti-
mates to design-related choices framing. Still, most studies use an
individual perspective in valuing health gains, whichmakes allud-
ing to equity concerns difficult if not impossible. The few studies
that take a broader view commonly do not explicitly address eq-
uity issues, making it difficult to explain the results in relation to
specific equity considerations. More consensuses on how and
where to obtain relevant valuations of health gains, suitable for
the context of societal decisionmaking, clearly remains an impor-
tant issue. The large variety of values encountered in the literature
stress this point.
As indicated in the Introduction, here we have taken the view
that the appropriate ICER threshold reflects the population’s WTP
for an additional QALY. This viewdoes not require the opportunity
costs within the health care sector (i.e., the marginal cost-effec-
tiveness of displaced spending) to be explicitly accounted for [101].
Alternatively, and related to a different view of the appropriate
decision context, the threshold can be seen as a representation of
the opportunity costs of displaced spendingwithin the health care
system with a fixed budget constraint. The two approaches are
fundamentally different (e.g., [2]). In both contexts, however, eq-
uity weights could be applied. Importantly, in the case of displace-
ment of existing health care programs, equity weights should be
applied not only to the health gains achieved by implementing a
new intervention (on which the focus has been in this article) but
also to the health foregone when displacing current interventions
[45].
Two ways of moving forward appear particularly feasible. The
first is to attempt to establish a reference value for a QALY gained
in a specific segment of the population, predefined in terms of
relevant equity characteristics. Existing reports on relative equity
weights—related to the characteristics of the reference segment—
would subsequently supply the relevant height of the threshold
for other groups of beneficiaries. An alternative approach wouldbe to directly elicit a social WTP for QALY gains, dependent on
specific characteristics of an intervention and its beneficiaries. In-
stead of separately eliciting equity weights and the ICER threshold
and then applying the weights within the ICER or threshold, it
might be more useful to combine the two procedures and simul-
taneously elicit segment-specific thresholds, that is, the QALY’s
social value for relevant “equity segments” of society. The seg-
ments would be based on normatively agreed upon equity-rele-
vant characteristics of beneficiaries. An outcome could be a cross-
sectional table of WTP values that vary with the beneficiary’s
characteristics. The decision maker could then directly apply the
adequate threshold to, for example, a 10-year-old mildly ill child.
The implied equity weights could be calculated, although because
of the varying thresholds, they need not be applied to the thresh-
old or the QALY gains within the ICER.
What is clear is that while equity weights and threshold values
have a definite theoretical link, it is nearly absent in empirical
work in a direct sense. This important conclusion inherently calls
for more research. To move forward in the field, we must norma-
tively establish which equity considerations should play a role in
allocating health care from a societal perspective. As indicated
above, not all elicited “equity” preferences seem appropriate to
normative decisions and the consequences of using specific
weights warrant clear justification. It seems that the label “equity
weights” is currently usedmore broadly than perhaps is appropri-
ate.We should note in that context that while equityweights have
a positive connotation, their use would not produce winners only.
Normatively considering age as an important equity consider-
ation, for instance, can ultimately lead to reduced health (care) for
the elderly (e.g., [102,103]). Defending such outcomes based on
equity considerations will at least require an open debate and
justification. Otherwise, allocating resources away from any seg-
ment of the society seems inappropriate.
Finally, although the distributional concerns and the ICER
threshold are relevant to decision makers and fit within the same
economic evaluation framework, the empirical and even the nor-
mative literature by and large treat the two topics separately. To
create a decision-making framework that balances equity and ef-
ficiency in health care, the gap between the two must be bridged.
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